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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDrroa's NorL-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIMITATIONS--MISTAKE IN GIVING DATE
OF ACCIDENT-Industrial Commission of Colorado vs. Pappas-No. 12813
-Decided July 27, 1931.
Facts.-The Industrial Commission and others seek the reversal of a
judgment of the District Court vacating the Commission's award denying
Pappas compensation for the permanent, total loss of vision in his left eye.
On Jan. 31, 1927, Pappas was hit in the left eye by a piece of coal. On
June 29, 1927, he was struck in the left eye by a rock. On December 21,
1927, the Commission found and awarded compensation on a basis of 10 per
cent loss of vision in left eye, and this award was paid. Later he lost all vision
in the left eye. Through error the physician appointed by the Commission
reported the accident as having occurred on January 31 instead of on June 29,
but the Commission held that the report being that the accident occurred on
January 31 and claim not having been filed in time was barred by the Statute
of Limitations.
Held.-The facts are undisputed that the mistake was an innocent one
of the physician in reporting the accident as having occurred on January 31,
caused by the fact that Pappas himself did not know the exact date, and
asked the employer company the date of the accident, and the company
through mistake, gave him the date of the former accident. Under such cir-
cumstances, the fact that the doctor gave Jan. 31 as the date does not create
such a conflict in the evidence as would call for the application of the rule
that a finding of the commission upon conflicting evidence is conclusive. In
effect, the evidence concerning January 31, explained and practically elim-
inated by uncontradicted evidence, amounts to no evidence.-Judgment af-
firmed.
CRIMINAL LAw-LQUOR VIOLATION-REMARKS OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY-
No. 12864-Holt v. The People-Decided July 6, 1931.





From the conviction, defendant alleged error on the following grounds:
1. The improper and prejudicial argument of the District Attorney.
2. Improper withholding of evidence by the District Attorney.
3. Improper cross-examination of the defendant.
4. Inconsistency of verdicts.
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Held.-l. (a) The comments of the District Attorney to the effect that
the case reeked of bribery was justified by the evidence.
(b) The remarks of the District Attorney relative to the defendant and
his common law wife were found not to be prejudicial.
2. Failure on the part of the District Attorney to call all of the wit-
nesses which are listed on the information is not prejudicial to the defendant.
The defendant could have called them if he wanted their testimony.
3. In cross-examining defendant, the District Attorney asked ques-
tions concerning crimes of which the defendant had been charged but not
convicted. As there was also evidence of prior convictions, this was held not
to be prejudicial.
4. There were no inconsistencies in the verdicts. A defendant might
be guilty of operating a still without being guilty of ownership or possession.
-Conviction sustained.
DIVORCE - RES ADJUDICATA - RIGHT TO DISMISSAL - DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE-No. 12719--Scofield vs. Scofield-Decided Sept. 14, 1931.
1. Where error is not assigned, such error will not be considered.
2. Plaintiff has an absolute right of dismissal only before trial. After
plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction of the court, disposed of motions and
demurrers, trial set, parties appear for trial, the trial was in progress, plain-
tiff's absolute right to dismiss is lost.
3. And in connection with preceding paragraph, where plaintiff does
not pay or tender costs incurred, the plaintiff has no absolute right to dismiss
without prejudice.
4. Where identity of parties is the same and the subject matter is the
same in two actions, the order of lower court is dismissing with prejudice on
defendant's motion was right.
5. Plaintiff will not be permitted to attack a former decree of divorce
upon the ground that plaintiff and 4efendant had resumed the marital rela-
tion when the decree was entered, = use the plaintiff was as culpable as
the defendant and cannot plead his or her wrong as a ground of obtaining
relief.
6. The defendant's motion for judgment is more than a survey of the
pleadings. It embraces a consideration of the evidence introduced.
7. Where parties stipulate to submit cause for final judgment on the
pleadings and the evidence, this precludes the introduction of further evidence
after the pronouncement of the judgment. Judgment affirmed.
BILLS AND NOTES-CNSIDERATION-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-No. 12793-
Church vs. The Polar Ice Cream Co.-Decided Sept. 14, 1931.
1. In a suit upon a promissory note against husband and wife, where
wife signed her own name and her husband's name, an answer containing the
allegation that the note was not executed for a valuable consideration is not
sufficient to raise an issue of no consideration.
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2. Where the answer alleges that the husband's name was affixed by
his wife, solely for the accommodation of the plaintiff, but the only evidence
in support thereof was that his wife told him that the lawyer for the plaintiff
wanted his signature to the note so she signed her husband's name to it, such
evidence was clearly objectionable, immaterial and incompetent to prove such
allegation.
3. This court will not consider the assignment that the note was void
because it contained certain provisions in restraint of trade and to prevent
lawful competition, where no evidence was offered in support thereof and the
question was not pleaded or raised in the trial court. Judgment affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-MOTION TO DisMIss WRIT OF ERROR-RESTRAINING
ORDER-No. 12921-Ward vs. Ward et al-Decided Sept. 14, 1931.
1. Where, after judgment in the court below, an administrator of an
estate who was a party therein, ceases to occupy such office and is succeeded
by another, such latter administrator is a necessary party in the Supreme
Court.
2. Under such conditions, the Supreme Court will order the successor
administrator to be made a party and will not dismiss the writ of error.
3. Where no supersedeas is applied for, a motion to dismiss the writ
on the ground that the estate is ready to be closed and that the assets will be
distributed and the estate closed before the case can be decided by this court
and therefore only a moot question is presented, is premature, where it appears
that the estate has not been closed and no order has been made by the County
Court for distribution of the estate.
4. No restraining order from this court is necessary under such cir-
cumstances. If the County Court should order the assets distributed, and
the estate closed while this suit is pending here, such order may be presented
for review in the customary manner and its validity and effect determined.
Motion to dismiss denied. Motion for restraining order denied.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES ARISING OUT OF
AND IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT-FALLING
THROUGH TRAP DOOR AT HOME-No. 12890-Ryan vs. Industrial Com-
mission-Decided Sept. 14, 1931.
1. Where a school superintendent was required to use his own automo-
bile in securing school supplies from a neighboring city, with knowledge and
acquiesence of school board, and in so doing, necessarily had to bring some of
the school supplies to his home, and while engaged in removing the school
supplies from his auto into his home, fell through a trap door and was injured,
such injuries were incurred and arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment. Judgment reversed.
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CHATTEL MORTGAGES--FUTURE ADVANCEMENTS-JUDGMENT CREDITORS
-PRIORITIES-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-No. 12429-Decided Sept. 14, 1931.
1. Where a chattel mortgage is given for a definite amount and makes
no mention of the fact that it was intended to secure future advancements,
it is not for that reason void under Chapter 72 of Session Laws of 1923.
2. Where the mortgage recited that it was given to secure a certain
sum and described the notes, date, terms, amount and maturities, the above
statute was not intended to invalidate such a mortgage.
3. The claim of a mortgagee, to the extent of the money already ad-
vanced, will be held superior to that of a subsequent judgment creditor but
as to monies advanced subsequent to the time the rights of judgment creditors
accrued, he will not have priority.
4. Where a mortgagee agrees orally to pay for groceries furnished the
mortgagor, he will be liable for such groceries thereafter furnished but not
liable as to those furnished prior to the oral promise.-Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-MOTION FOR DIRECTED VER-
DICT-BALLISTIC EXPERT-DANGER OF EXPERT TESTIMONY-REvIEW-
ING EVIDENCE-No. 12846-Matthew vs. People-Decided Sept. 21, 1931.
1. Where the sole evidence of guilt is the assertion that certain mark-
ings appear on bullets fired from a gun by a ballistic expert, which markings
he testified were identical with the markings on bullets taken from the body
of deceased, and where such bullets are before the Supreme Court, where it
can examine them the same as the jury did, the findings of the jury will not be
conclusive, but the sufficiency will be determined by this Court.
2. In such case, the rule applicable is the identical rule applied by the
appellate Court where all the evidence in support of the judgment is presented
by deposition.
3. Upon examination of the bullets no such marking as testified to by
the expert can be found, hence the evidence is entirely too slender to support
a sentence of life imprisonment.
4. Under such circumstances, defendant's motion for a directed verdict
should have been sustained.-Judgment reversed with directions to discharge
defendant.
CLERK'S OFFICE BROADCASTING
Mr. Stackhouse, Clerk of the District Court, announces
that there will be no juries during December.
